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ABSTRACT
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening,
monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable
clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific
mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second
randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held
weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-
existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the
expansion areas.
JEL: C93, D71, D82, D91, G21, O12, O16, O17
Keywords: microfinance, group lending, group liability, joint liability, social capital,
microenterprises, informal economies, access to financeI.  Introduction 
Group liability is often cited as a key innovation responsible for the expansion of access to 
credit for the poor in developing countries (Morduch 1999; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 
2005; Microcredit Summit Campaign 2005). This contract feature purports to solve a credit market 
failure by mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Under group liability, clients 
have an incentive to screen other clients so that only trustworthy individuals are allowed into the 
program. In addition, clients have incentives to make sure funds are invested properly and effort 
exerted. Finally, enforcement could be enhanced because clients face peer pressure, not just legal 
pressure, to repay their loans. Thus, by effectively shifting the responsibility of certain tasks from 
the lender to the clients, group liability claims to overcome information asymmetries typically 
found in credit markets, especially for households without collateral. 
Group liability could also be seen as a tax, effectively increasing the net interest rate on 
borrowers. This could be true particularly for individuals with stable income flows, who perhaps 
have the best outside alternatives for credit. Little is known about sensitivity to interest rates at the 
household level (Attanasio, Goldberg and Kyriazidou 2000; Karlan and Zinman 2007a). Measuring 
the elasticity of demand with respect to group versus individual liability is important both in order 
to understand the net “demand” effect of this important loan characteristic, but also for forming 
credit market policy to help deepen the quantity and quality of access to finance for the poor. 
The basic empirical question of the relative merits of group versus individual liability has 
remained unanswered for many reasons of endogeneity. Merely comparing performance of one 
product versus another, within or across lenders, fails to establish a causal relationship between the 
contract terms and outcomes such as repayment, selection, or welfare, due to countless unobserved 
characteristics that drive individual selection into one contract or the other, as well as institutional 
choices on what to offer, and how. Lenders typically chose the credit contract based on the context 
in which they operate. Morduch (1999) and Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) point out 
in their microfinance reviews that the performance of group liability contracts in developing 
countries indeed has been very diverse.
1  Thus far, however, since most claims are supported with 
anecdotes, we still lack good evidence on the relative importance of group liability vis a vis the 
other mechanisms, such as dynamic incentives, regular public repayments, etc. found in “group 
lending” schemes. Quoting Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), 
                                                 
1 See also Adams and Ladman (1979) and Desai (1983). On anecdotal evidence on the limits to joint liability, see Matin 
(1997), Woolcock (1999) Montgomery (1996) and Rahman (1999). 
  2“The best evidence would come from well-designed, deliberate experiments in which 
loan contracts are varied but everything else is kept the same.” 
This is precisely the goal of the paper. We use two randomized control trials conducted by 
the Green Bank of Caraga in the Philippines to evaluate the efficacy of group liability relative to 
individual liability on the monitoring and enforcement of loans. In the first trial, half of Green 
Bank’s existing group-lending centers in Leyte, an island in central Philippines, were randomly 
converted to individual liability. Note that this implies that the “baseline” clients, those already 
receiving loans at the time of the conversion, were already screened using group liability. We then 
examine whether, after the peer screening, group liability has any additional effect on the mitigation 
of moral hazard through improved monitoring or enforcement. In the second trial, we worked with 
the Green Bank of Caraga in their expansion into new areas. Villages were randomly assigned to 
either be offered centers with group liability, centers with individual liability or centers with 
phased-in individual liability, that is, centers that would start with group liability which would then 
convert to individual liability after successful completion of one loan.  
The first trial allows us to separate selection from moral hazard, one of the most difficult 
empirical challenges when studying information asymmetries in credit markets.
2  The “surprise” 
factor of this design, created by generating a sample of borrowers that select under one contract 
regime but then monitors and enforces repayment under another, allows for a cleaner test of theory 
than offering one method to some individuals and another method to other individuals. This is 
useful both academically and practically in the design of products. However, it also limits the 
immediate policy prescriptions since the treatment conducted here is not a viable long-term product 
for a lender (one cannot perpetually “surprise” borrowers). Individuals selected under group liability 
may be different (e.g., safer) than those selected under individual liability. Although the analysis 
from this experiment focuses on baseline (“surprise”) clients, we also present results from new 
members, that is, those that joined the program after the removal of the joint liability clause. This 
allows us to answer some (more limited) questions on selection as well. 
This second trial, on the other hand, combines the selection, monitoring and enforcement 
and evaluates the overall effect of the liability on all three mechanisms. It is thus less precise in 
testing specific mechanisms, but more policy-relevant in that the intervention is replicable without 
engaging in ongoing “surprises.” 
                                                 
2 See Karlan and Zinman (2007b) for an interest rate experiment which also separately identifies  adverse selection and 
moral hazard in a South Africa credit market. 
  3The first trial lasted three years, and we find no change in repayment for those centers 
converted to individual liability. In earlier work, with one-year results, we also found no change in 
repayment (Giné and Karlan 2006). We also find higher client growth in converted centers, and 
evidence that it is because new clients are more likely to remain in the program (whereas the 
“baseline” clients, who have larger loans, are more likely to leave under the individual liability 
structure). In auxiliary data collected on internal procedures, we find direct evidence that individual 
liability leads to less monitoring of each other’s loan (although as noted, this lowered monitoring 
does not lead to higher default). Lastly, we find that those with weaker social networks prior to the 
conversion are more likely to experience default problems after conversion to individual liability, 
relative to those who remain under group liability. In sum, as conversions from group to individual 
liability become more commonplace in the microfinance community, we take an important step 
towards understanding whether and how such conversions work. 
In the second trial, on new areas, we find no statistically significant difference in repayment 
rates across any of the three groups. We do however find that credit officers were less likely to 
creating groups under individual liability, and qualitatively this was reported to us as caused by 
unwillingness of the credit officer to extend credit without guarantors in particular barangays. 
II. Background 
Microfinance Trends 
In recent years, some micro-lenders, such as the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) 
in Bangladesh, have expanded rapidly using individual liability loans but still maintaining group 
meetings for the purpose of coordinating transactions. Others, like BancoSol in Bolivia, have 
converted a large share of its group liability portfolio into individual liability lending. Even the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, whose founder Mr. Yunus won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, has 
recently relaxed the group liability clause in the Grameen II program by allowing defaulters to 
renegotiate their loans without invoking group pressure. Many of these groups (e.g., ASA) have 
made this shift while still keeping the “group” intact. Thus, while liability is individualized, the 
group process helps lenders lower their transaction costs (by consolidating and simplifying loan 
disbursal and collection logistics) while possibly maintaining some but not all of the peer screening, 
monitoring or enforcement elements due to reputation and shame. The shift to individual liability is 
not merely the Grameen Bank and a few other large, well-known lenders, but many lenders around 
the world are following the lead of the large, well-known lenders. Many policymakers have been 
advising lenders who seek to expand more rapidly (such as the Green Bank of Caraga, with whom 
we conducted this field experiment) to engage in individual liability rather than group liability. 
  4This shift from group liability to individual liability loans has accelerated as the 
microfinance community learns about some of the pitfalls of group liability lending. First, clients 
dislike the tension caused by group liability. Excessive tension among members is not only 
responsible for voluntary dropouts but worse still, can also harm social capital among members, 
which is particularly important for the existence of safety nets. Second, bad clients can “free ride” 
off of good clients causing default rates to rise. In other words, a client does not repay the loan 
because she believes that another client will pay it for her, and the bank is near indifferent because it 
still gets its money back. Third, group liability is more costly for clients that are good risks because 
they are often required to repay the loans of their peers. This may lead to higher dropout and more 
difficulty in attracting new clients. Finally, as groups mature, clients typically diverge in their 
demand for credit. Heterogeneity in loan sizes can result in tension within the group as clients with 
smaller loans are reluctant to serve as a guarantor for those with larger loans. In sum, while 
repayment may improve under group liability, outreach may be smaller, so the effect on lender’s 
overall profitability and the poor’s access to financial markets is ambiguous. 
Throughout this paper we maintain an important distinction between “group liability” and 
“group lending." “Group liability” refers to the terms of the actual contract, whereby individuals are 
both borrowers and simultaneously guarantors of other clients’ loans. “Group lending” merely 
means there is some group aspect to the process or program, perhaps only logistical, like the sharing 
of a common meeting time and place to make payments. The heart of this paper is testing whether 
the removal or absence of group liability from a “merely logistical” group lending program leads to 
higher or lower repayment rates, client retention and to changes in group cohesion. 
Theoretical Background 
The theoretical literature on joint liability builds on an earlier contract theory literature from 
the early 1990s that studies when a principal should contract with a group of agents to encourage 
side-contracts between them as opposed to contracting individually with each agent.
3  
In a survey article, Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) summarize the literature on joint liability 
by identifying four channels through which this contract feature can help institutions improve 
repayment: (i) adverse selection: ascertaining the riskiness of borrowers (Ghatak (1999; 2000), 
N’Guessan and Laffont (2000), and Sadoulet (2000)) or by the insurance effect that results from 
diversification even if borrowers do not know each other well (Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier 
(2000)), (ii) ex-ante moral hazard: ensuring that the funds will be used properly (Stiglitz (1990) and 
                                                 
3 Examples of this literature include, but are not limited to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), Varian (1990) and Arnott 
and Stiglitz (1991). 
  5Laffont and Rey (2000)), (iii) monitoring: ensuring that the borrower tells the truth in case of 
default about her ability to pay, (iv) voluntary default, or ex-post moral hazard: enforcing 
repayment if the borrower is reluctant to pay (Besley and Coate (1995)). Group liability contracts in 
theory can lead to higher repayment because borrowers have better information about each other’s 
types, can better monitor each other’s investment, and may be able to impose powerful non-
pecuniary social sanctions at low cost. 
However, there are other theories that suggest that group liability may instead jeopardize 
repayment. For example, Besley and Coate (1995) point out that borrowers who would repay under 
individual liability may not do so under group liability. This situation may arise if members realize 
that they cannot repay as a group. In this situation, since no further loans will be granted (if rules are 
adhered to), members that could otherwise repay decide to default because the incentive of future 
credit is not longer present. This model also demonstrates that social collateral can help make joint 
liability work better than individual liability (baring the strategic default situation mentioned 
above). However, Sadoulet (2000) argues that “social collateral” induced by group liability is not 
sufficient to ensure high repayment rates. Chowdhury (2005) develops a model that abstracts from 
adverse selection but shows that joint liability alone cannot mitigate an ex-ante moral hazard 
problem. In his model, either sequential lending as introduced by the Grameen Bank, where 
borrowers in a group do not all get the loan at the same time but sequentially, or monitoring by the 
lender combined with joint liability, makes group-lending contracts feasible. Despite being less 
efficient than peer monitoring, if monitoring by the lender is not too costly, then contracts that 
stipulate only monitoring by the lender may also be feasible, such as the individual liability contract 
of Green Bank of Caraga in the Philippines studied here (and put forward by ASA in Bangladesh), 
which keeps the group “logistical” aspects of the program but removes the joint liability.  
Even if joint liability does not jeopardize repayment, theory also suggests it may do no 
better than individual liability. Rai and Sjostrom (2004) show that both individual and group 
liability alone can be dominated by a contract that elicits truthful revelation about the success of the 
peers’ project. In their setup, high repayment is triggered by the ability of banks to impose non-
pecuniary punishments to members according to their reports about their success and that of others. 
More importantly, if borrowers can write contracts with one another (i.e., side-contract), the 
effectiveness of group liability contracts will be limited.     
Despite being the focus of much of the theoretical literature on group liability, repayment is 
only one outcome of interest to the lender, because its ability to retain good borrowers and attract 
  6new ones is equally important to assess the overall profitability. Indeed, an institution with perfect 
repayment may be more profitable with lower repayment but a larger client base.
4 
III. Experimental Design and Data Collected 
A.  Trial #1: Experimental Design in Pre-existing Areas 
The Green Bank of Caraga, a for-profit, regulated rural bank operating in  Philippines, 
conducted a field experiment in which they removed the group liability component of their 
Grameen-style
5 group liability program, called BULAK.
6 Typically a lending center starts with 15-
30 individuals residing in the same barangay (community). Centers grow in size as demand 
increases, without predetermined maximum sizes. Within each center, members divide into groups 
of five. Under the normal group liability system, those in the group of five are the first layer of 
liability for any default. Only if those five fail to pay the arrearage of an individual is the center as a 
whole responsible for an individual. New members joining an existing center are also assigned into 
groups after mutual agreement is reached. If at one point in time there are enough new members to 
form a new group of five, they may do so. This trial was conducted on the island of Leyte, and all 
169 centers on the island were included in the sample frame. 
All loans under the BULAK program are given to micro-entrepreneurial women for their 
business expansion. The initial loan is between 1,000 - 5,000 pesos (roughly $18 - $90). The 
increase in loan size depends on repayment of their last loan, attendance at meetings, business 
growth, and contribution to their personal savings. The interest rate is 2.5 percent per month, 
calculated over the original balance of the loan. The client has between 8-25 weeks to repay the 
loan, but payments must be made on a weekly basis during the center meeting. 
As part of the BULAK program, clients are also required to make mandatory savings 
deposits at each meeting. At loan disbursal, each member deposits 100 pesos plus two percent of the 
loan amount into savings. In addition, each member must pay an additional ten percent of their 
weekly due amount (principal plus interest) into their individual savings account. Member savings 
may be used to repay debts and also act as collateral, although in this last case there are no fixed 
rules. Finally, 20 pesos ($0.18) per meeting are required for the group and center collective savings 
                                                 
4 In related papers, Madajewicz (2005) and Conning (2005) study when monitoring is best done by the lender and when 
it is best left to the peers. They both find that wealthier clients prefer individual liability loans. We cannot test the 
validity of this prediction because in this field experiment, loans are not backed by any form of physical collateral, so 
comparable (and relatively poor) borrowers are subject to one or the other form of liability. 
5 This is a Grameen “style” program since the bank conducts some basic credit evaluation, and does not rely entirely on 
peer selection. The bank’s evaluation steps include essentially two components: physically visiting the business or home 
to verify the presence of the enterprise and its size, and an assessment of the repayment capacity of borrowers based on 
the client-reported cash-flows of their enterprise. 
6 Bulak ("flower" in Tagalog) stands for "Bangong Ug Lihok Alang sa Kalambuan", meaning “Strive for Progress.” 
  7account (10 pesos for the group and 10 pesos for the center savings accounts). The center savings 
cover mostly the construction of the center meeting building (a small house or hut in the village) 
and other center activities, or as a last resort to repay member loans if the center is being dissolved 
and default remains.
7 The group savings is held as collateral to cover arrearage within each group. 
In the first trial, the Green Bank randomly converted existing centers with group liability 
loans to individual liability loans. All other aspects of the program remain the same (including 
attendance at center meetings and weekly payment made in groups).
8 Clients were also not told this 
was an experiment, and thus had no information from the bank to suggest that a failure to repay 
could lead to a reversal of the change. The only two features that changed are the group liability and 
the savings rules.
9 By removing the group liability, no member is held liable for another member’s 
default. Thus, members are no longer forced to contribute towards the repayment of other members 
in default and no longer required to sign as co-maker of others' loans. This allows us to isolate the 
impact of group liability on the mitigating moral hazard through peer pressure by comparing the 
repayment behavior of existing clients in group-liability centers and converted centers. 
It is important to note that although this change removed the group liability rules, it did not 
remove all social influences on repayment. Group payments were still done at the weekly meeting. 
Although after the conversion group meetings did not include a discussion or review of who was in 
default, the fact that all were at the meeting provided ample opportunity for people to learn of each 
other’s status. Thus, many clients may still repay not out of social pressure, but rather out of 
concern for their social reputation. One’s reputation is important, for instance, in order to secure 
informal loans in the future from their peers, outside the scope of the lending program. 
The second component of the treatment involved the savings policy. The group and center 
savings were dissolved and shifted into individual savings accounts. The total required savings 
deposits remained the same.
10 With the conversion of group and center savings into individual 
                                                 
7 In our observation, this never occurred. 
8 Although the choice was effectively voluntary (a group could complain about the switch and remain with group 
liability), not a single group complained. Researchers observed groups clapping when the announcement was made. 
9 All other loan terms remained the same in both treatment and control groups, including the dynamic incentives, the 
interest rates, the lack of collateral, the length of the loan, the frequency of the payment, etc. If Green Bank had 
enforced a stricter group liability rule, the change to individual liability would also have entailed the issuing of new 
loans when other clients were in default. In practice, however, loans were already being issued to clients in good 
standing even when other individuals were in default. 
10 The new Personal Savings quota will be the previous amount of Personal Savings (based on the loan amount), plus 
P20, the amount previously given for Center and Group savings.  
  8savings, there no longer were funds set aside to pay for center activities. Thus, all center activities in 
treatment groups were to be paid for out of individual accounts on a per-activity basis
11.  
Our sample includes 169 BULAK centers in Leyte, handled by 11 credit officers in 6 
branches. Among these, 161 had been created before August 2004, when the experiment started. 
Green Bank’s main competitors are NGOs (such as TSKI) which mostly offer group-liability loans 
and cooperatives (such as OCCCI) which offer individual liability loans. At the time of the first 
conversion, about 28 percent of the existing centers were located in barangays with no other 
competitor, 53 percent of the centers were in barangays with at least one NGO and 47 percent of the 
barangays with Green Bank presence had at least one individual liability lender.
12   
Figure 1 shows the timeline of the first trial and data collected. In August 2004, we 
implemented the first wave of conversions in 11 randomly selected centers (one center per field 
officer). Three months later, in November 2004, we randomly selected 24 more centers to be 
converted to individual-liability (wave two). In the sample frame for this randomization, we 
included 8 additional centers formed after August 2004. Finally, nine months after wave one, in 
May 2005 we randomly selected 45 more centers from the 125 remaining (wave three). As of May 
2007, 34 months after the start of the experiment, the final month for which we have administrative 
data, there are 56 converted centers and 50 original (group-liability) centers (26 converted and 37 
original centers were dissolved in the past three years). Conversions were done in the three waves 
because of operational and repayment concerns. In particular, Green Bank wanted to assess early 
results to ensure default did not rise substantially before converting all centers randomly assigned to 
treatment.
13  We stratified the randomization by the 11 credit officers in order to ensure a fair 
implementation across credit officers in terms of potential workload and risk and also orthogonality 
with respect to credit officer characteristics. In addition, we periodically checked with credit 
officers and conducted surprise visits to center meetings and clients’ homes to confirm that 
converted centers had individual liability and that control centers had group liability. 
B.  Trial #2: Experimental Design in New Areas 
The second trial had two important differences as compared to the first trial. First, it was 
conducted as part of an expansion into new geographic areas, hence individuals were informed 
                                                 
11 Note that Green bank’s savings policy changed in January 2006. The banks removed the group savings requirement 
and increased the mandatory savings toward personal savings account to 20% of weekly amortization for all clients.  
12 We run separate regressions for barangays with individual liability lenders and barangays with group liability lenders. 
The results do not differ significantly from those of Table 5 using all barangays and thus are not reported.  
13 Note that increased default is not necessarily bad for the bank, since the bank cares about profits not merely default. 
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experimental group, a phased-in individual liability group.  
Figure 2 shows the timeline of the second trial and data collected. Credit officers in these 
newly established branches first conducted a market survey to identify feasible communities for 
Green Bank to enter. The criteria for the community selection were the same as that of pre-existing 
areas—the number of enterprises and economic condition, safety, and accessibility. Between 
August 2005 and August 2007, 124 barangays served by eight branches in five provinces were 
identified by Green Bank as feasible and randomized. The selected barangays were then visited by 
an independent survey team for a baseline business census,
14 followed by Green Bank’s marketing 
activities. Out of the 124 randomized barangays, the bank opened lending centers in 68 barangays. 
After the business census and initial community orientations were conducted,  56 communities 
(45%) were deemed not feasible mainly due to lack of interest from female entrepreneurs and 
default or safety concerns by credit officers. We will examine this important selection issue in the 
analysis, given that the success of opening a center is correlated with treatment assignment. 
The experimental design then randomly assigned all selected barangays into one of the three 
types of lending products: 1) group-liability (original BULAK program in pre-existing areas 
without group savings requirement), 2) individual-liability (original BULAK program, without 
group savings requirement nor group liability), and 3) phased-in individual-liability (group liability 
in the first loan cycle only; group liability is removed after successfully paying back the first 
loan).
15  Similarly to pre-existing areas, all lending centers hold weekly mandatory meetings and 
payments are made in groups. If a new member joined a phased-in individual liability center after 
the center had already been formed, then the new member had to be accepted by all center 
members, and the existing members were liable for new members’ first loan only. Thus, the third 
product design tries to balance between group and individual liability: it relies on peer selection 
mechanism, while removing the potentially excessive peer pressure that may lead to good clients 
from dropping out of the program in the long run. This experiment was conducted during the bank’s 
three-year expansion, beginning in August 2005. 
                                                 
14 The baseline survey was conducted with all female household members who owned small businesses in the village. 
We collected information on business characteristics, revenue, household assets, demand for credit, and social network.  
15 Initially, there was also a fourth group, a pure control group, which the Green Bank did not enter. The take-up  rate 
was too low however to measure impact, and thus we decided to increase the power on the liability structure test by 
randomly assigning the control group to one of the three treatment groups and entering all areas, rather than maintaining 
one no-credit control group. 
  10C. Data Collected  
The first experiment, in pre-existing areas, uses data from five sources. First and most 
importantly, we use the Green Bank’s full administrative data on repayment, savings, loan sizes, 
number of clients, and client retention rates. We have the data for all 3,285 clients who were active 
members of the 161 centers at the time of the first randomization in August 2004, as well as the 
eight new centers opened after August 2004. We use the data from one year prior to the first wave 
of the experiment to 24 months after the last wave of experiment, thus enabling us to incorporate 
center-level fixed effects in our analysis with pre and post observations. Second, we use the data 
from an activity-based costing exercise that credit officers conducted, where for a given week, they 
had to keep a log of how they allocated their time across the different tasks they typically perform 
(e.g., attending meetings, assessing new clients, enforcing repayments, etc). The data were collected 
in January 2006. Third and fourth we use the data from a baseline and follow-up social network 
survey, conducted in November 2004 and January 2006.
16  Finally, we use a survey of clients in 
pre-existing areas designed to understand the observed differences between converted and control 
centers. This survey was conducted in November 2005 (about one year after the start of the 
experiment in pre-existing areas) and asked about loans from other lenders and clients’ knowledge 
on businesses and repayment performance of other members. In this survey, we employed stratified 
random sampling from 1) baseline clients, 2) clients who joined the program over the three months 
prior to the survey, and 3) clients who dropped out within the three months prior to the survey. 
The second experiment, in new areas, uses four sources of data. First, we use the complete 
administrative data for all 68 centers in new areas from the time of center establishment up to May 
2008. Second, prior to Green Bank’s program introduction in treatment villages, we conducted a 
census of all households with enterprises. Third, we conduct an activity-based costing exercise in 
July 2008 that is similar to that conducted in the first experiment. Fourth, we conducted a social 
network survey of the initial members of each formed center. These social network surveys were 
collected by credit officers during the first center meeting. Unlike the first experiment, due to 
budgetary reasons we did not conduct a follow-up social network survey, nor an activities survey 
about specific monitoring and enforcement activities in each center. 
Tables 1A and 1B present summary statistics and orthogonality checks for the clients and 
communities in the conversion areas sample. Table 1A shows that the randomization yielded 
observably similar treatment and control groups, when treatment groups are pooled in pre-existing 
                                                 
16 Note the social network baseline was conducted after the first wave of conversions but before the second and third 
waves, hence the social network analysis will not include the first wave of the sample frame. 
  11areas. This holds when we examine group-level measures (Panel A) as well as individual level 
measures (Panel B). Table 1B presents summary statistics for the second experiment. Panel A and 
Panel B verify that the initial randomization in new areas also created assignment groups that are 
similar in village characteristics, in nineteen out of the twenty tests reported in Columns 5 and 6. 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Primary Results 
  We test several hypotheses that emerged in the previous discussion of the relative merits of 
group versus individual liability. We will organize the results by question, and then within each 
question we will first show the results for the pre-existing areas (the first experiment) and then for 
the new areas (the second experiment). The first analysis uses the individual loan-borrower as the 
unit of observation, and examines the impact on key variables that affect bank profitability, such as 
repayment, savings deposits held at the Green Bank by borrowers, and loan size (Table 2A and 2B). 
Then we analyze client drop-out (Table 3), client retention, and success in attracting new clients, as 
well as loan portfolio at the center level (Table 4A and 4B). All of the above analyses are conducted 
with the bank’s administrative data. Then we examine the difference in the costs of managing 
individual versus group liability centers, using the data from activity-based cost exercises (Table 5). 
The rest of the analyses use the survey data on social network, other loans, and members’ 
knowledge about repayment performance of others. We analyze the mechanisms through which 
activities changed within the bank in pre-existing areas; this provides evidence of the experimental 
design being implemented as instructed, and also evidence of specific peer screening, monitoring 
and enforcement activities (Tables 6 and 7). Then we examine heterogeneous treatment effects by 
social network on default (Table 8) as well as impacts on social networks themselves in pre-existing 
areas (Table 9 and 10). Lastly, we test the treatment effect on the strength of social network in 
newly established centers in expansion areas (Table 11). 
Throughout the analysis of the first experiment, we define a “treated” loan to be one that 
matures after the conversion from group to individual liability. In other words, we consider loans 
that have any exposure to individual liability as treated cycles.
17 
  Table 2A Panel A presents the primary results for the first experiment. The specifications 
use individual loan cycle level data, with standard errors clustered at the center level, the unit of 
randomization. The sample frame includes only clients that were borrowers at the time of the initial 
randomization. This allows us to focus analytically on the ex-post changes in behavior generated by 
                                                 
17 Alternatively, the treated cycle could be defined as all loans released after the conversion. Results are robust to this 
alternative definition of treated cycle.  
  12group versus individual liability, holding constant a sample frame of individuals screened under a 
group liability regime. 
  Specifically, we estimate a difference-in-difference (using pre-post and treatment-control 
data) model using OLS: 
yigt = α + βTgt + δt + θg +  εigt, 
where the subscript i refers to the individual, g the group, and t the time period, T is an indicator 
variable if center g is under an individual liability regime at time t, δt are time fixed effects and θg 
are center fixed effects. Thus, β is the coefficient of interest. 
  Table 2 (Panel A, Columns 1 through 6) shows that the conversion to individual liability had 
no adverse effect on repayment for the baseline clients, regardless of the measure of default. Given 
that the default rate is very low, the impact of conversion can be seen as a one-sided test, where at 
best there is no increase in default. Not only is the point estimate close to zero, but most 
economically significant effects can be ruled out: the 95 percent confidence bound on proportion of 
loan balances in default at the time of maturity (Column 3) is -0.034% ± 0.047% and the 95 percent 
confidence bound on the likelihood of any default 30 days after maturity (Column 6) is -1.058% ± 
3.218%. Thus, we do not find strong enough evidence to support the “social collateral” story of 
Besley and Coate (1995) that predicts higher repayment for group liability loans on average.
18  
However, as noted elsewhere, the conversion to individual liability does not remove all “social 
collateral” since repayment is still public, and someone may repay in order to protect their 
reputation in the community. 
  Table 2 Panel B shows similar results for the new clients. In this sample frame, selection is 
confounded with monitoring and enforcement. Yet even here, those selected under individual 
liability and given individual liability loans are also no more likely to default than those selected 
under group liability and given group liability loans. The 95% confidence bounds also allow us to 
rule out economically large effects, although they are slightly larger than those for the baseline 
clients in Panel A. The second experiment, in new areas, will speak to this question as well, and 
find similar (null) results. 
Table 2 Columns 7 and 8 show savings behavior and loan sizes for both baseline and new 
clients. We find a reduction in voluntary savings (i.e., savings over and beyond the required cash 
collateral they have to pay along with loan payments) and a reduction in loan size for all clients. 
One may have expected higher savings in individual liability since the savings deposits were not 
                                                 
18 Below, we will examine heterogeneous treatment effects (Table 9) where we will find evidence that default increases 
for those with lower baseline measures of social collateral. 
  13held as collateral for other people’s loans: the expected return on savings is higher under individual 
liability (assuming there is some default in expectation under group liability).
19  Greater reduction 
in loan sizes on new clients under individual liability could be due to several mechanisms: an 
indication of the selection of new entrants (poorer individuals were screened out under group 
liability, and are now able to join); more restrictive lending by credit officers, and/or lower appetite 
for larger loans since borrowers no longer rely on the implicit insurance that group liability 
provides. In qualitative interviews, credit officers deny that they restrict loan sizes of clients under 
individual liability centers. Anecdotes from credit officers tell us a different story: the clients in 
converted centers see that their savings are accumulated more quickly (because the required 
personal savings increased) and decide to withdraw the savings for various purposes at the end of 
the loan cycle—this, in return, lower their capacity to borrow in the subsequent loan cycles. While 
this may not be a favorable outcome for the bank profits, the client welfare under individual liability 
may increase if they use more savings and borrow less. However, we do not have quantitative data 
to provide strong evidence to support a particular mechanism.  
Of course, the conversion to individual liability does imply both a reduction in peer pressure 
and a potential increase in bank pressure to repay (see Chowdhury, 2005). The above empirical 
analysis concludes that the net effect is nil. To confirm that in fact the conversion was adhered to 
and group liability was not imposed in the treatment centers, we ask current members the reason 
that others left. Appendix Table 1 shows these results. Under individual liability, individuals are 
less likely to be forced out of the center in net (Column 1), but importantly Column 2 shows that 
individuals are less likely to be forced out by their peers and more likely by the credit officer. 
We now turn to the second experiment, on new areas. Table 2B presents the primary results. 
The specifications use individual loan cycle level data, with standard errors clustered at the center 
level. Because the second trial took place in expansion areas and there is no pre-intervention data, 
we simply compare the post-intervention outcomes across treatment and control groups, using the 
credit officer and time fixed effects. Table 2B Panel A shows the average effects of all loans. 
Similarly to the pre-existing areas, the coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
Table 2B Panels B and C show the same analysis separately for the first cycle loans and 
repeat loans. The results in Panel B are consistent with the overall analysis in Panel A—coefficients 
are small and insignificant, indicating that there is no difference in repayment performance across 
group, individual, phased-in individual liability clients. Table 2 Panel C shows that repeat loans 
                                                 
19 This assumes that the substitution effect is larger than the income effect for savings elasticity. 
  14under individual liability actually have a lower probability of defaulting by 3 percentage points at 
the 30 days after maturity date (Column 6), although this is the only significant result out of six 
measures of default, and two sample frames, and thus this result is not robust. 
Table 3 uses a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the likelihood of dropout in both 
pre-existing and new areas. While in pre-existing areas we find that the baseline clients are slightly 
more likely to stop borrowing as a result of conversion to individual liability, for new clients we 
find the opposite, that those under individual liability are less likely to stop borrowing (Table 3 
Panel A). Table 3 Panel B shows the results in new areas. There is no significant difference (both 
statistical and in magnitude) in the likelihood of clients’ dropout between clients under individual 
and group liability, while clients under phased-in individual liability are significantly less likely to 
drop out. Dropout as an outcome variable is naturally ambiguous: from a borrower’s perspective 
this could be a sign of success, that the loan successfully addressed their cash needs in the enterprise 
or their personal life and they no longer need credit. Or, alternatively, and especially for new 
clients, dropout could be a sign that once in the program the client learns that it is not good for 
them, that it causes issues in their personal life, social life, or business to have the debt burden. 
  Table 4A examines the main outcomes at the center level in pre-existing areas. We estimate 
the following specifications using OLS: 
ygt = α + βTgt + δt + θg +  εgt, 
where ygt is either center size, retention rate,
20 new accounts, number of dropouts, total loan 
disbursement, or center dissolution for center g at time t, δt  is an indicator variable equal to one for 
time period t (time fixed effect), θg is a center fixed effect, and Tgt is an indicator variable equal to 
one if group g at time t had been converted to individual liability. The time fixed effects refer to 
three-month time periods (since individuals within centers do not get issued loans at the same time). 
The coefficient of interest is β. We test whether the liability rule matters by examining whether the 
coefficient β is significantly different from zero. Note that here, since the unit of observation is the 
center (at a certain point in time), we use information from all clients who belonged at each point to 
the center between August 2003 and May 2007. 
We find that individual liability is much better at attracting new clients (Panel A, Column 2), 
leading to larger centers (Column 1) and that individual liability makes existing centers 13.7% 
points less likely to be dissolved (Panel B Column 2). This final result is the largest, and has 
                                                 
20 The retention rate between t and t+1 is defined as the percentage of clients at t that are still clients at t+1.  
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cited concern among microfinance institutions. 
Table 4B shows the center-level analysis on institutional outcomes in the second 
experiment. The center-level analyses are also conducted with all loans (Panel A), first cycle loans 
only (Panel B), and repeat loans only (Panel C). Since 46% of the villages randomized were not 
entered by Green Bank, the analyses on active accounts and loan disbursement are conducted for 
villages successfully entered by Green Bank (Columns 1 and 4) as well as for all villages 
randomized (Columns 2 and 5). While there is no significant difference in the center size and total 
loan size at the center-level across three product groups when restricting the analysis to the villages 
entered by Green Bank, the analysis with all randomized villages including those not entered by 
Green Bank show that the center size is significantly smaller on average for both individual liability 
and phased-in individual liability groups. This is a consequence of either Green Bank staff   
reluctance or inability to enter villages assigned to individual liability and phased-in individual 
liability (see discussion in next section). A village-level regression on the likelihood of Green Bank 
entering (Panel C) confirms that Green Bank was less likely to enter the villages assigned to 
individual or phased-in individual liability on average, although this effect on individual liability is 
not statistically significant. 
V.  Additional Results on Specific Mechanisms 
We now turn to four sets of auxiliary data.
21 First, we examine the results of the activity-
based costing exercise for both experiments completed by the credit officers in order to measure the 
change in their allocation of their time across centers. Second, for just the first experiment, we 
examine the results of a client follow-up survey conducted in November 2005 (over one year after 
the initial conversion) on clients in both the treatment and control groups. This survey questions 
were designed to tell us more about three possible mechanisms that could be influenced by the 
liability structure: center activities, selection and the flow of information (monitoring). The survey 
was conducted during center meetings and was administered to a sample of active members, 
including individuals who were members at the time of the conversion as well as new clients who 
entered afterwards.
22 Third, for the first experiment we use social network data collected before the 
intervention and again one year later to examine the impact on social networks, as well as 
                                                 
21 The results here from the first experiment were also reported in an unpublished working paper (Giné and Karlan 
2006), but are being combined into this paper in order to provide the richer context and understanding of mechanisms 
that are behind the results. 
22 Since meeting attendance is compulsory, we should not be concerned with having a bias sample of survey 
respondents. In any event, we compared past repayment between respondents and non-respondents in converted and 
control centers and found no statistical differences across samples (largest t-stat is 0.82).  
  16heterogeneous treatment effects for groups with different preexisting levels of social networks. 
Fourth, for the second experiment, we use baseline social network data to examine how screening 
differed across treatment groups. 
A. Lender Costs: Activity-Based Costing Exercise 
It is important from a sustainability perspective to examine the complete impact on the 
lender of such a change from group to individual liability. If the lender spends more money on 
credit officer labor in order to screen, monitor and enforce loans then this is a necessary component 
of the analysis. In order to evaluate to what extent this was true, we conducted an activity-based 
costing exercise in which each credit officer kept a detailed diary of all activities for one week. We 
then attributed their activities to either repayment (preparing for center meetings plus collection and 
processing of repayments outside of the meetings), center meeting, monitoring, enforcement and/or 
re-loan activities. Table 5 Panel A and Panel B report these results in pre-existing areas and new 
areas respectively. In pre-existing areas we find no statistically significant differences in the way 
credit officers allocated their time, and furthermore the point estimates are actually the opposite of 
what one may have expected on enforcement. On approval and processing of new loans (Column 
7), credit officers do spend more time under individual liability, although again this result is not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, in new areas credit officers spend more time on 
repayment activities (monitoring, and enforcement) in individual liability centers than in group 
liability centers. In particular, the time spent on repayment activities per individual liability center is 
90 minutes more per week than that per group liability center on average, and this effect is 
statistically significant. There are no statistically significant differences between time spent in 
phased-in individual liability centers and group lending centers. Given that each credit officer 
manages around 10-15 centers and collects repayment from all clients on weekly basis, this result 
implies a shift of activity away from program introduction and marketing activities (although 
statistically insignificant) and towards repayment activities. This is consistent with the lower 
probability of forming an individual liability center discussed above (although it was not 
significant). More importantly, we may fail to see a difference in repayment across treatment groups 
in new areas (Table 2B) precisely because the credit officer is deliberately spending more time in 
repayment activities of individual liability centers.  
B. Center Activities, Survey Results from First Experiment  
The client follow-up survey asked questions about center penalties for missing meetings, 
leaving early and missing payments as well as various activities such as anniversary, Christmas and 
snacks during the meeting. Table 6 reports changes in penalties (columns 1 and 2) and activities 
  17between treatment and control centers. We find that treatment centers impose lower penalties, 
possibly because meetings run smoother now that there is less need to enforce peer pressure among 
clients. However, the conversion to individual liability may have resulted in lower center cohesion 
as evidenced by the lower probability of social events (not significant) and the lower amount spent 
(significant for Christmas parties). 
C. Selection and Monitoring, Survey Results from First Experiment 
Four sets of analysis provide insight into the changes in the selection of clients and 
monitoring resulting from the change in liability. We asked each member how well they knew the 
new members that had joined the center since intervention began. Table 7 Columns 1 and 2 show 
these results. We find that the prior members are more likely to know new members well under 
individual liability than under group liability. This is striking, given the typical assumption that 
group lending programs encourage peers to screen each other. However, this is consistent with 
evidence that the depth of family relations within a group is correlated with default (Ahlin and 
Townsend 2007). Under individual liability, peers no longer fear the acrimony of having to punish 
someone close to them if there is default, and hence are more willing to invite in their closest 
friends and family. New members, on the other hand, are less  likely to know the other new 
members. Since new members are typically not the ones who bring in new members, this indicates 
that groups are making fewer group decisions on whom to admit and instead individuals are inviting 
their close friends or family. Thus prior members are closer to the new members, and new members 
are more distant to the other new members. This is also consistent with the fact that new members 
in treatment centers are less concerned with screening and monitoring other new clients.  
Second, we examine how well individuals know the “type” of the other members in the 
group. We report these results in Table 7 Columns 3-12. We asked each individual five questions: 
(1) What is the business of person X? (Columns 3 and 4), (2) What is the required installment 
amount for person X? (Columns 5 and 6), (3) How many weekly installments did person X miss 
over the past three months? (Columns 7 and 8), (4) Did person X miss any payments over the past 
three months? (Columns 9 and 10), and (5) Do you think person X will miss some payments over 
the next three months? (Columns 11 and 12). We do not find any change in ability to report the 
peers’ businesses, but we do find lower levels of ability to report who has missed payments (hence 
suggestive evidence of reduced monitoring, although also explained by simply not having to 
participate in repaying that person’s missed payments) and lower levels of ability to predict who 
  18will or will not default. Again, this is evidence of lower monitoring, since it implies individuals are 
less informed about the status of each other and, hence, their ability to repay their loans.
23   
The third result on selection looks at the distribution of ability to pay (rather than observed 
repayment) among existing clients and new clients in treatment and control centers. We asked how 
many times in the last 3 months they had difficulty in repaying the loan, regardless of whether or 
not they ended up completely repaying the loan installment. We believe that this measure (rather 
than observed default) captures the combination of “type” (selection) and ex-ante moral hazard 
(effort) that is generated from group versus individual liability because being in default is only 
observed when the member does not have enough cash and other members fail to contribute toward 
the installment. Since side contributions are compulsory in control centers but only voluntary in 
treatment centers, differences in default rate would come from not only different ability to repay but 
also different contribution levels from fellow group members.  
In a world where creditworthiness is verifiable through a costly screening process, there are 
two groups of borrowers that would join only individual liability centers. On one end of the 
creditworthiness distribution, bad risks would be screened out and rejected from group liability 
centers, but could be allowed into individual liability centers because current borrowers lack the 
incentive to screen (and the lender may be unable to screen as effectively as the peers). On the other 
end of the distribution, good risks may have little to gain and much to lose from the implicit risk-
sharing agreement imposed by group liability. They decide not to join group liability centers 
because they fear being forced to help other members repay more frequently than they will receive 
help. Yet, they join individual liability centers because repayment only depends on their 
performance. The left panel of Figure 3 plots the distribution of the number of times new clients had 
difficulty making their payments, while the right panel plots the same distributions for baseline 
clients (those borrowing at the time of conversion, hence screened under group liability). 
Interestingly, the distributions of baseline clients in treatment and control centers look alike, but the 
distribution of new clients in treatment centers is more concentrated around zero than that for 
control centers. This suggests that good risks were reluctant to join group liability centers but do so 
after these centers are converted to individual liability. We do not find evidence of bad risks also 
joining individual liability centers. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equal distributions between 
treatment and control centers is rejected at 10 percent for new clients but not for baseline clients. 
                                                 
23 Note, Chowdhury (2005) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) use the term monitoring to denote information about 
project choice, while we measure knowledge about missed payments, perhaps closer to auditing.  
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competitive setting. Did individuals increase or decrease their borrowing with other lenders after the 
Green Bank converted to individual liability? The results are reported in Table 8, where it is clear 
that the answer depends entirely on whether the other lender is a group or an individual liability 
lender. If we restrict the analysis to barangays in which the competition is engaged in group 
lending, then we find that baseline Green Bank clients are more likely to borrow from them after 
their group is switched to individual liability. This indicates perhaps that some individuals among 
baseline clients prefer group liability (perhaps for the risk-sharing component of group liability) and 
hence when the group liability is removed they remain with the Green Bank but also then seek a 
loan from a separate group liability program. On the other hand, when the competition only offers 
individual liability, we see a reduction in the likelihood that baseline clients seek a loan (although 
this result is only significant in the tobit specification on loan size, and has a p-value of 0.17 for the 
probit specification). This indicates that when the Green Bank switches to individual liability, 
individuals who prefer individual liability are more satisfied, and individuals who prefer group 
liability seek supplementary loans from other group lending programs. Results are less conclusive 
for the new clients, perhaps due to the lower sample size.  
D. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with respect to Social Networks 
  Theoretically, the shift to individual liability may have worked better or worse in groups 
with different levels of preexisting social networks. If social collateral keeps repayment high, then 
“releasing” the collateral by converting to individual liability (and replacing the social collateral 
with bank pressure and mere public disclosure of default, but not group liability) may lead 
individuals with higher social capital to have lower repayment rates. On the other hand, if 
individuals have higher social capital because of their stronger and more trustworthy characters, 
then the shift to individual liability should be less likely to influence their decision to repay (since 
they are a “trustworthy” type, perhaps irrespective of whether social collateral is at stake or not). 
We test the net effect of these possible mechanisms in Table 9 by interacting treatment with 
one of various social network measures. The social network data were collected during the center 
meetings in all centers in between the first and second wave of the randomization (for this reason, 
the first wave centers are removed from this analysis, since their “baseline” occurred after the 
treatment began). The survey procedure was simple: in public, in the meeting, a surveyor asked an 
individual to stand up and then asked all other members in the group to raise their hand if their 
answer to a specific question about their relationship with this person was “yes." This method 
prevents one from asking highly personal questions (e.g., “Would you lend to X if they asked 
  20you?”) but does allow for higher precision on questions which are of public knowledge (since one 
has the attention of everyone in the group to facilitate answering the questions). We categorize the 
social network questions as either “knowledge” or “trust”. “Knowledge” includes: family, friend 
since childhood, buys products or services, or visits once a week for social purposes. “Trust” 
includes has given a loan to the other person outside of the Green Bank program, voluntarily helped 
them pay their Green Bank loan, or turns to this person for advice or help. 
  We then examine the primary repayment measure: percentage of loan past due at the time of 
maturity. We find that default is lower for those with stronger social networks relative to those with 
weaker social networks. This is true both for “knowledge” measures of social capital (Column 5) 
and the pooled aggregate index (Column 10), but not for the “trust” measures (Column 9). 
  These results may be an indication that those identified as having stronger “trust” social 
networks are in fact a more trustworthy “type,” hence the shift to individual liability has no adverse 
effect on their likelihood of repaying. In other words, being “trustworthy” is a personal 
characteristic that determines ones social networks and also leads to higher repayment of loans. This 
is consistent with results from Karlan (2005), in which trustworthy behavior in a lab experiment in 
the field predicted repayment of loans one year later to a microcredit organization in Peru. An 
alternative hypothesis is that those with stronger social networks must repay their loan in both 
setups in order to protect their social networks. Those with weaker social networks have less to lose 
from the “shame” of being seen in default (less social collateral, in the model of Besley and Coate 
(1995)), and hence the shift to individual liability generates higher default. Of course, we cannot say 
conclusively why this result is heterogeneous, but it does suggest that the existing literature on the 
link between social capital and repayment within group lending is an important literature, and that 
more needs to be learned about the circumstances under which social capital helps versus hurts both 
the repayment and growth in lending programs. 
E. Impact on Social Networks, Conversion Areas Only 
Next, we examine how the liability structure affects the social network among center 
members in both conversion and new areas. In Table 10 we show the results of the analysis on 
changes in social network in pre-existing areas. As we have both baseline and follow-up data on 
social networks, we are able to employ a difference-in-difference empirical specification. We find 
only one social network channel to have changed: likelihood to help another person with a side-loan 
in order to help her make her loan payment. Social networks should change under individual 
liability for many reasons. First, with fewer incentives to monitor, the quantity of interaction may 
fall. On the other hand, the quality of the interaction may increase since they no longer have to 
  21pressure each other to repay. From selection, as found earlier, we find groups more connected 
because individuals are inviting closer friends and family to join the center. However, in net, we 
find no significant impacts on social networks, except the reduction in side loans.  
F. Selection Effects with Respect to Social Networks, New Areas Only 
When entering into new areas, we examine how the liability rules influence the social capital 
that exists amongst the initial members. The theoretical prediction is ambiguous. One may expect 
group liability centers to have stronger social network, because members are directly held liable for 
other members’ loans. Alternatively, if group liability imposes excessive pressures on members, 
close friends and neighbors may be more likely to join individual liability centers, where they do 
not have to risk their social capital. Table 11 presents the effect of the liability structure on the 
social networks amongst those who borrow. The results show that there is no consistent and 
significant difference in the social network among center members across group, individual, 
phased-in individual liability centers, with the exception that those who join individual liability 
centers have a lower average proportion of members who know other members since childhood. 
This is consistent with the finding in conversion areas that new members were less likely to know 
each other well, but since this is the only one of five social network measures that finds a 
difference, we consider this result suggestive at best. 
VI. Conclusion 
The choice of group or individual liability is perhaps one of the most basic questions lenders 
make in the design of loan products in credit markets for the poor. Despite the importance of this 
decision, past empirical research on group and individual liability has not provided policymakers 
and institutions the clean evidence needed to determine the relative merits of the two 
methodologies. In this study, we use two randomized control trials to evaluate the impact of group 
liability on the performance of clients and the profitability for the lending institution. Naturally, 
these are from one lender in a few regions of the Philippines, but this is a transition we are 
witnessing around the world; thus this is not a highly unusual lender for wanting to make this 
conversion. As with all empirical research, many questions persist as to whether these findings will 
hold in other countries, in other cultures and with other lenders. Although this decision by the bank 
to shift from group to individual liability is not unusual, we still must ask whether the culture or 
macroeconomic conditions, for instance during the three year time period of this study, led to 
similar outcomes for both individual and group borrowers, and whether under different external 
conditions differences in repayment would arise. Social science, just like physical sciences, needs 
replication in order to solve these issues. 
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compared to group liability leads to no change in repayment but did lead to larger lending groups, 
hence further outreach and use of credit, for pre-existing groups. Second, in new areas, we found 
the bank officers less willing to open groups despite no increase in default. Thus supply constrained 
the growth of the lending program, whether for good cause or unwarranted fear by the employee is 
outside the scope of our data to assess. Third, we do find statistically significant evidence of some 
of the mechanisms discussed in the group liability literature, such as screening and monitoring, but 
we simply do not find that it adds up in an economically meaningful way to higher default. 
One could argue that the results from the first experiment lend support to the adverse 
selection story of Ghatak (2000) because borrowers that selected into the program under joint 
liability would tend to be safer. The finding that after the removal of group liability monitoring goes 
down but repayment does not change, suggests, at the very least, that peer monitoring or peer 
pressure are unimportant. However, the lack of default for new members too suggests that the 
answer is not that simple, that even new clients brought into centers built under group liability repay 
their loans. This could be a result of group liability creating well-functioning groups, and even new 
members adhere to the practices and policies of the pre-existing members. 
The larger new centers, combined with the lack of increased default, suggest that the 
screening process has changed without worsening repayment. The findings seem consistent with the 
model of Chowdhury (2005), where the removal of group liability has probably resulted in an 
increased monitoring and screening done by credit officers, although we did not find an increase in 
their workload.  
  Our findings are also consistent with the work of Greif (1994) in a rather different context. 
He suggests that collectivist societies, like joint liability institutions in our setting, are based on the 
ability to impose social sanctions to players that deviate from the agreed norms of conduct. But this 
requires a level of trust and knowledge among players that may hinder expansion of the set of 
players thus leaving efficient trades unrealized. A more individualistic society requires fewer 
exchanges of information among players and is thus able to grow faster. It does necessitate, 
however, well-functioning formal institutions to enforce contracts. In our context, shifting some of 
the burden from clients to credit officers strikes this balance successfully. The institutional 
enforcement is sufficient to recover loans without group liability, and the individual liability allows 
for more growth and outreach for the lender.  
 In sum, the recent trend of microfinance institutions expanding their individual lending 
products (or in some cases, shifting from group liability to individual liability) may help deepen 
  23outreach and provide more flexible microfinance products for the poor. Our findings suggest that 
the innovators finding methods of lending individually (and more flexibly, see Karlan and 
Mullainathan (2009)) to the poor may be moving in the right direction. Certainly, as with all 
empirical research (experimental or non-experimental), replication is imperative for both policy and 
theory in order to learn when these findings hold and when they do not. 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
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(corrected 
value)
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Figure 3: Kernel Density: Number of weeks that clients had difficulty repaying
New Clients Baseline Clients
The left panel shows the kernel densities of the center average of the number of weeks in difficulty repaying over the three
months prior of the survey in November 2005 for treatment centers (red) and control centers (blue). The right panel plots the
same distribution for baseline clients. The sample includes clients who attended the center meeting when the survey was
conducted.
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l
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i
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u
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o
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i
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c
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c
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.
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.
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
a
l
l
 
b
a
r
a
n
g
a
y
s
 
(
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
s
)
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
a
s
 
f
e
a
s
i
b
l
e
s
 
b
y
 
G
r
e
e
n
 
B
a
n
k
 
s
t
a
f
f
.
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
b
a
r
a
n
g
a
y
s
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
a
 
c
e
n
t
e
r
 
w
a
s
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
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D
a
t
a
 
c
o
m
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
r
e
p
r
i
s
e
 
c
e
n
s
u
s
.
 
P
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
 
(
5
)
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
 
(
2
)
 
-
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
 
(
3
)
)
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
z
e
r
o
.
 
 
P
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
i
n
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
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6
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a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
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o
f
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c
o
l
u
m
n
 
(
2
)
 
-
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
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4
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b
e
i
n
g
 
z
e
r
o
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h
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x
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h
a
n
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a
t
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t
i
m
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h
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e
x
p
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r
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n
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a
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5
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p
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S
$
1
.               
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
P
r
o
p
o
r
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P
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c
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i
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P
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c
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c
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h
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L
o
a
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C
y
c
l
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L
e
v
e
l
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C
o
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
A
r
e
a
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O
L
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R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
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c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
b
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l
e
n
d
i
n
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c
e
n
t
e
r
s
 
i
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p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
,
 
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
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*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
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*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
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T
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
e
q
u
a
l
s
 
o
n
e
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
a
n
 
c
y
c
l
e
 
e
n
d
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
c
e
n
t
e
r
s
;
 
z
e
r
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
 
d
a
t
e
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
f
r
a
m
e
 
f
o
r
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
c
l
i
e
n
t
s
,
 
i
.
e
.
,
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
w
h
o
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
c
t
i
v
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
2
0
0
4
;
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
f
r
a
m
e
 
f
o
r
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
 
i
s
 
n
e
w
 
c
l
i
e
n
t
s
,
 
i
.
e
.
,
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
w
h
o
 
j
o
i
n
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
2
0
0
4
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
o
r
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
.
 
 
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
s
s
e
d
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
i
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
c
l
i
e
n
t
 
d
i
d
 
n
o
t
 
m
a
k
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
u
l
l
 
i
n
s
t
a
l
l
m
e
n
t
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
t
a
l
l
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
c
e
s
s
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
i
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
c
e
s
s
s
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
l
i
e
n
t
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
b
e
y
o
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
v
e
r
 
a
 
l
o
a
n
 
c
y
c
l
e
 
(
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
z
e
r
o
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
a
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
)
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n
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n
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n
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e
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w
e
e
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P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
a
s
t
 
d
u
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
,
 
a
t
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
 
d
a
t
e
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
h
a
v
i
n
g
 
p
a
s
t
 
d
u
e
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a
t
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
 
d
a
t
e
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
a
s
t
 
d
u
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
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3
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y
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t
u
r
i
t
y
 
d
a
t
e
I
n
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c
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a
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n
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u
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3
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t
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p
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c
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.
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.
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.
0
0
5
-
0
.
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(1) (2)
Panel A: Conversion Areas
Sample frame:  Baseline clients New clients
Individual liability 1.121* 0.857***
(0.071) (0.042)
Observations 8310 7157
Panel B: New Areas
Sample frame:  All clients
Individual liability 0.973
(0.48)
Phased-in individual liability 0.794***
(3.31)
Observations 3610
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model estimated is the
Cox proportional hazard. Reported are hazard ratios and standard errors in parentheses,
calculated assuming within-center clustering. Lower hazard ratio (<1) indicates that clients
in Treatment centers stay longer in the program and that conversion into individual-liability
is associated with lower likelihood of dropping out.  
Table 3: Impact on Dropout
Cox proportional hazard model, failure = dropout
Dependent Variable: Binary variable equal to one if the client has dropped out
 
 
,
     
Panel A: Center Growth
Dependent variable: Active accounts New accounts Retention rate Number of dropouts Loan Disbursement
Coefficient 
Variation of loan 
amount
Specification: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual liability 2.828** 0.840*** 0.025 0.199 3,566.337 -0.021
(1.396) (0.263) (0.016) (0.332) (9,934.659) (0.024)
Mean of dependent variable 15.36 2.51 0.80 3.16 98387.23 0.44
Observations 2507 2017 2017 2017 2507 2130
Number of centers 169 169 169 169 169 169
R-squared 0.21 0.06 0.28 0.18 0.25 0.09
Panel B: Center Dissolution
Dependent variable:
Specification: OLS Probit
Individual liability -0.013 -0.137*
(0.012) (0.078)
Mean of dependent variable 0.03 0.37
Observations 2017 169
Number of centers 169
R-squared 0.080
OLS, Probit
Table 4A: Institutional impact At the Center Level, Conversion Areas
Dissolved center
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. "Treatment" is an indicator variable equal to one if the center has been
converted for a given observation. All regressions except Panel B, Column 2 use fixed effects for credit officers and months of maturity dates, and standard errors are clustered by
lending centers. Every center has an observation on each outcome for every three month between August 2003 and May 2007. Panel B, Column 6 uses fixed effects for credit officers
and reports the marginal effects for the coefficient on treatment. Total loan amount is the aggregated loan amount disbursed in a center, and average loan amount is the average loan
size per client. Both numbers are in pesos (1 US $ = 52 pesos). Panel A, Columns 2-4 excludes centers that had been dissolved in the previous time periods; The sample for Panel A
  olumn 1 is active centers in which there are matured accouts in each time period. C 
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e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
0
5
w
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
o
r
 
n
o
t
 
e
n
t
 
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
e
d
d
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
b
y
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
,
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
i
t
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
A
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
u
s
e
f
i
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
f
o
r
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
f
f
i
c
e
r
s
.
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
f
o
r
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
a
n
d
(
2
)
i
s
a
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
c
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
f
o
r
h
o
w
w
e
l
l
t
h
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
k
n
e
w
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
w
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
s
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
;
 
0
 
i
f
 
d
i
d
 
n
o
t
 
k
n
o
w
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
1
 
i
f
 
k
n
e
w
 
a
 
l
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
2
 
i
f
 
k
n
e
w
 
w
e
l
l
,
 
3
 
i
f
 
k
n
e
w
 
v
e
r
y
 
w
e
l
l
.
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
d
e
f
a
u
l
t 
T
r
u
s
t
 
i
n
d
e
x
V
o
l
u
n
t
a
r
y
 
h
e
l
p
G
o
 
f
o
r
 
a
d
v
i
c
e
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
(
0
.
2
7
7
0
.
0
9
6
0
.
1
1
6
0
.
8
(
0
.
2
8
2
)
(
0
.
4
1
2
)
(
0
.
4
2
9
)
(
0
.
1
.
8
5
0
-
0
.
4
1
6
-
0
.
1
4
3
0
.
(
1
.
3
5
7
)
(
0
.
3
7
7
)
(
0
.
4
5
2
)
(
0
.
-
2
.
5
6
6
1
.
4
5
8
0
.
9
7
6
-
1
.
1
(
2
.
1
6
1
)
(
2
.
7
8
1
)
(
2
.
2
4
7
)
(
0
.
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
2
2
4
4
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
c
e
n
t
e
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
M
e
a
n
 
o
f
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
0
.
1
1
1
0
.
0
4
6
0
.
2
9
1
0
.
1
3
2
0
.
4
1
1
0
.
3
6
3
0
.
0
1
5
0
.
0
7
2
0
.
0
9
3
0
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
o
f
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
b
e
l
o
w
:
1
0
)
7
1
*
*
4
0
5
)
2
7
7
2
4
6
)
7
0
*
*
5
0
5
)
2
2
4
5
4
.
0
2
4
1
9
0
0
6
)
                     
K
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
K
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
T
r
u
s
t
F
a
m
i
l
y
F
r
i
e
n
d
s
B
u
y
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
V
i
s
i
t
 
o
n
c
e
 
a
 
w
e
e
k
G
i
v
e
n
 
l
o
a
n
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
0
.
3
2
6
0
.
0
8
6
0
.
6
2
1
*
*
0
.
1
8
8
0
.
8
6
0
*
*
0
.
3
4
6
(
0
.
2
9
4
)
(
0
.
3
6
6
)
(
0
.
2
9
5
)
(
0
.
3
4
4
)
(
0
.
3
8
4
)
(
0
.
3
0
7
)
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
0
.
1
2
3
-
0
.
0
0
7
0
.
2
1
8
-
0
.
4
3
4
0
.
3
3
1
0
.
0
9
9
(
0
.
5
4
1
)
(
0
.
5
6
8
)
(
0
.
2
7
1
)
(
0
.
4
0
2
)
(
0
.
2
5
5
)
(
0
.
5
8
3
)
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
x
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
-
0
.
9
2
9
2
.
1
5
9
-
0
.
9
8
0
*
*
0
.
1
9
6
-
1
.
1
9
7
*
*
-
2
.
0
7
7
(
0
.
9
6
9
)
(
2
.
2
5
8
)
(
0
.
3
9
9
)
(
0
.
7
2
2
)
(
0
.
4
9
3
)
(
1
.
5
7
5
)
1
2
F
r
i
e
n
d
s
:
 
H
a
v
e
 
k
n
o
w
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
o
n
e
 
w
a
s
 
a
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
(
n
o
n
-
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
/
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
)
3
B
o
u
g
h
t
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
:
 
H
a
v
e
 
b
o
u
g
h
t
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
o
r
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
4
V
i
s
i
t
 
o
n
c
e
 
a
 
w
e
e
k
:
 
V
i
s
i
t
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
h
o
u
s
e
 
f
o
r
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
s
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
c
e
 
a
 
w
e
e
k
.
 
5
K
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
:
 
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
4
6
G
i
v
e
n
 
l
o
a
n
:
 
H
a
v
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
a
 
l
o
a
n
 
o
u
t
s
i
d
e
 
o
f
 
B
u
l
a
k
.
7
V
o
l
u
n
t
a
r
i
l
y
 
h
e
l
p
e
d
:
 
H
a
v
e
 
v
o
l
u
n
t
a
r
i
l
y
 
h
e
l
p
e
d
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
r
e
p
a
y
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
i
n
 
B
u
l
a
k
.
 
8
G
o
 
f
o
r
 
a
d
v
i
c
e
:
 
T
u
r
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
a
d
v
i
s
e
 
o
r
 
h
e
l
p
 
f
o
r
 
a
n
y
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
l
i
f
e
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
;
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
,
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
,
 
o
r
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
a
l
.
 
9
T
r
u
s
t
:
 
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
6
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
8
1
0
A
l
l
:
 
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
1
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
4
,
 
a
n
d
 
6
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
8
.
y
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
c
e
n
t
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
 
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
;
 
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
;
 
*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
.
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
e
n
t
e
r
s
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
F
a
m
i
l
y
:
 
H
a
v
e
 
k
n
o
w
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
o
n
e
 
w
a
s
 
a
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
(
g
r
a
n
d
p
a
r
e
n
t
s
,
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
s
,
 
s
i
b
l
i
n
g
s
,
 
s
p
o
u
s
e
s
,
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
,
 
g
r
a
n
d
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
u
s
i
n
s
)
.
A
l
l
T
a
b
l
e
 
9
:
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
o
n
 
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
,
 
C
o
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
A
r
e
a
s
O
L
S
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
a
s
t
 
d
u
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
 
d
a
t
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
F
r
a
m
e
:
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
 
w
h
o
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
s
u
r
v
e
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
N
e
w
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
N
e
w
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
N
e
w
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
P
r
o
b
i
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
N
e
w
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
t
P
r
o
b
i
t
T
o
b
i
t
O
L
S
P
r
o
b
i
t
P
r
t
o
b
i
T
o
b
i
t
O
L
S
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
2
8
-
8
,
7
0
3
.
4
3
9
*
-
5
4
1
.
2
9
7
*
.
0
2
9
)
(
4
,
8
5
6
.
9
0
0
)
(
2
8
7
.
1
9
3
)
5
7
4
7
6
2
5
7
.
1
0
0
.
0
9
1
3
0
3
.
3
6
1
4
6
4
.
9
8
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
i
t
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
A
l
l
s
f
r
o
m
N
G
O
s
;
t
h
a
t
o
f
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
3
)
-
(
4
)
a
r
e
 
A
r
e
a
s
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
F
r
a
m
e
:
 
C
l
i
e
n
t
s
 
w
h
o
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
o
o
k
 
p
l
a
c
e
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
 
c
e
n
t
e
r
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
0
5
H
a
s
 
l
o
a
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
H
a
s
 
l
o
a
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
L
o
a
n
 
s
i
z
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
L
o
a
n
 
s
i
z
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
B
a
r
a
n
g
a
y
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
C
o
o
p
s
 
o
f
f
e
r
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
-
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
o
n
l
y
B
a
r
a
n
g
a
y
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
N
G
O
s
 
o
f
f
e
r
i
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
-
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
o
n
l
y
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
F
r
a
m
e
:
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
0
.
0
6
2
*
-
0
.
0
2
1
5
,
0
3
9
.
8
2
5
*
*
*
-
7
0
.
7
4
3
-
0
.
0
4
9
-
0
.
0
(
0
.
0
3
4
)
(
0
.
0
5
1
)
(
1
,
9
0
7
.
1
4
1
)
(
2
8
4
.
2
1
1
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
(
0
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
4
7
4
2
6
9
4
7
4
2
6
9
4
7
6
2
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
0
7
0
.
1
4
0
.
1
1
0
.
0
7
0
M
e
a
n
 
o
f
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
0
.
1
1
0
.
1
6
6
5
3
.
3
8
9
1
2
.
6
4
0
.
1
0
0
.
0
6
R
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
b
y
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
c
e
n
t
e
r
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
,
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
h
a
v
e
f
i
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
f
o
r
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
f
f
i
c
e
r
s
.
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
f
o
r
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
-
(
2
)
a
r
e
b
i
n
a
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
c
l
i
e
n
t
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
h
a
s
l
o
a
n
b
i
n
a
r
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
o
n
e
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
l
i
e
n
t
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
 
h
a
s
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
C
O
O
P
s
.
T
a
b
l
e
 
8
:
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
B
o
r
r
o
w
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
L
e
n
d
e
r
s
,
 
C
o
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n 
 
 
                     
 
 
F
a
m
i
l
y
F
r
i
e
n
d
s
B
u
y
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
V
i
s
i
t
 
o
n
c
e
 
a
 
w
e
e
k
G
i
v
e
n
 
l
o
a
n
V
o
l
u
n
t
a
r
y
 
h
e
l
p
G
o
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
-
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Dependent variable:
Proportion of other 
members in the group 
for whom this member 
knew the directions to 
their house
Proportion of other 
members in the group 
who were known to this 
members since 
childhood.
Proportion of other 
members in the group 
who have bought 
products or services 
from this member
Proportion of other 
members in the group 
who have given this 
member a loan outside 
of BULAK
Proportion of other 
members in the group 
who turn to this member 
for advise or help for 
any type of life problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual liability -0.018 -0.199*** -0.064 0.036 -0.005
(0.028) (0.072) (0.070) (0.048) (0.075)
Phased-in individual liability -0.031 -0.099 -0.075 0.065 0.101
(0.030) (0.073) (0.098) (0.069) (0.100)
Mean of dependent variable (0.049) (0.098) (0.140) (0.103) (0.113)
Observations 571 571 571 571 571
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 2 40 . 5 40 . 2 30 . 6 80 . 6 3
Mean of dependent variable 0.94 0.69 0.62 0.21 0.42
Table 11: Social Network Among Clients Who Formed Centers, New Areas
OLS
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in Columns (1) - (5) are clustered by lending centers and all regressions
use fixed effect for branch. Regressions in Columns (1) - (5) includes initial members of the lending centers when they were first formed. Dependent variable in Column (6) is the herfindahl
index of microenterprises among the initial members of the centers. The regression controls for the herfindahl index at the barangay level.
 
 
Forced Out
Forced Out by Center or 
Credit Officer
Probit Multinomial Logit
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Forced Out
Individual liability -0.089***
(0.006)
Dependent Variable: Forced Out by Center Members
Individual liability -0.521***
(0.032)
Dependent Variable: Forced Out by Credit Officer 
Individual liability 0.621***
(0.060)
Observations 550 550
R-squared 0.007 0.016
Appendix Table 1: Reasons for Dropout, Conversion Areas
Sample Frame Restricted to clients who dropped out from the program 
within the three months prior to the follow-up survey.
Robust standard errors clustered by respondents in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Marginal coefficients reported for the probit specifications. The omitted variable for the multinomial-logit model in column (2) is
voluntary dropout. "Forced out" and "Forced out by center members" include those clients who "voluntarily" dropped out because she
was embarrassed for her bad performance. Dependent variable in column 1 is a categorical variable which equals to one if any
ndent reported that the client was forced out by center members or by credit officers, an zero otherwise. Dependent variable in
n 2 is a categorical variable which equals to one if any respondent reported that the c ent was forced out by center members,
equals to two if anyone reported that the client was forced out by credit officer, and zero otherwise.
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